Piercing the Shield of Privity in Products Liability -- A Case for the Bystander by Tew, Susan L.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
10-1-1968
Piercing the Shield of Privity in Products Liability --
A Case for the Bystander
Susan L. Tew
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Case Noted is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Susan L. Tew, Piercing the Shield of Privity in Products Liability -- A Case for the Bystander, 23 U. Miami L. Rev. 266 (1968)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol23/iss1/17
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIII
PIERCING THE SHIELD OF PRIVITY IN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY-A CASE FOR THE BYSTANDER
A gas tank exploded at the duplex home of the Toombs family. Sev-
eral members of the family were injured and one child was killed. A
woman and her child, who lived in the other side of the duplex, were also
injured.
The gas tank was owned by the defendant gas company and had been
used for the storage of the gas sold to the Toombs family. The individual
members of the family and the other injured persons brought suit against
the defendant manufacturer and the defendant gas supplier alleging neg-
ligence and breach of implied warranty. Evidence was introduced on two
alleged causes of the explosion-a defect in the weldings of the tank and
the overfilling of the tank by defendant gas supplier. The jury exonerated
the manufacturer from liability,' but found the gas company liable to all
persons who were injured.
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed the verdict
for the plaintiffs and remanded the case for a new trial.2 The court classi-
fied the plaintiffs into two categories, (1) members of the Toombs
family who were bailees and (2) mere bystanders, and held that neither
class of persons could recover on the grounds of breach of implied war-
ranty.' The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case by conflict certi-
orari and held, reversed: The distinction between bailment and sale drawn
by the district court of appeal was wholly inapplicable to the facts, involv-
ing the sale and handling of a dangerous commodity in a container subject
to bailment provisions.4 A bystander is entitled to recover for breach of
implied warranty even though he is not in privity with the seller or user
of the product under the "dangerous instrumentality" exception to the
privity requirement when he is necessarily in the vicinity of the hazard of
1. The jury apparently believed that the explosion was not due to a defect in the manu-
factured tank but rather to the fact that it was overfilled with gas.
2. Fort Pierce Gas Co. v. Toombs, 193 So.2d 669 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966). New trial was to
be held on the issue of negligence.
3. The Toombs family could not recover because there was no absolute liability in bail-
ment cases as in cases involving a sale, id. at 672, citing Brookshire v. Florida Bendix Co.,
153 So.2d 55 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963). The court made an error here because, on the basis of the
jury verdict exonerating the manufacturer, the explosion was caused by the gas which was
sold and not by the tank which was bailed. See note 4 infra.
4. Toombs v. Fort Pierce Gas Co., 208 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1968). It is conceptually diffi-
cult to fit the theories of implied warranty in sales to a situation involving the handling of
gas. The product sold is not defective, nor is it dangerous in design. In reality, the liability
here is a strict liability for mishandling of a dangerous commodity like dynamite and not a
breach of implied warranty in the sale. The closest analogy in implied warranty is presented
in situations where the bottler is held liable for exploding bottles, although he did not manu-
facture the bottle and presumably overfilled it. See Canada Dry Bottling Co. v. Shaw, 118
So.2d 840 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960). A legal purist could engage in interesting discussions as to
whether returnable bottles are sold or bailed like the gas tank in the instant case. For prac-
tical purposes, sale of bottled soft drinks are treated as sales transactions and are not split
into bailment and sale as in the instant case.
CASES NOTED
such a commodity. Toombs v. Fort Pierce Gas Co., 208 So.2d 615 (Fla.
1968).5
By extending liability for breach of implied warranty to include the
bystander, the Florida Supreme Court has done away with even more of
the few remaining traces of the requirement of privity of contract to
maintain such an action.' The innocent bystander, neither a consumer
nor a user of the product, has been the center of conflict in the battle over
the scope of responsibility for breach of implied warranty7 envisioned by
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors." Only two other courts have granted
the bystander a right of recovery. In Piercefield v. Remington Arms, the
Supreme Court of Michigan permitted a bystander to recover when a gun
exploded because of a defective shell and injured him.' A lower court in
Connecticut permitted a golfer's widow to recover against the manufac-
turer of a car with defective brakes which rolled down a golf course hill
and killed her husband.' ° Other cases which have considered the problem
have denied recovery."l
The history of the development of warranty, the bastard offspring
of tort and contract, has been traced in detail by many legal scholars and
need not be repeated here.1 2 It should be noted, however, that at the same
period of time that warranty was developed as a contract action,' 3 the
English courts in Winterbottom v. Wright14 extended the privity require-
ment of contract law to an action for negligence in supplying a chattel. In
Winterbottom, the court was concerned that if the operation of contracts
to supply chattels were not confined to the parties who made them, the
most outrageous results would ensue: "[I]f the plaintiff can sue, every
passenger, or even any person passing along the road, who was injured by
5. Toombs v. Ft. Pierce Gas Co., 208 So.2d 615 at 617 (Fla. 1968).
6. The clarity of the holding in this case is somewhat marred by the retention of the
"dangerous instrumentality" device which can be made to fit the situation in subsequent
cases, as has been done before. See for example notes 64-66 infra and accompanying text.
7. Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967). The case is
very clear in defining the scope of implied warranty. See also Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MIN. L. REV. 791 (1966). Prosser discusses the recov-
ery of bystanders and other non-users as a question of public policy which has until now
centered on the consumer. Id. at 819. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, com-
ment o, caveats the question of the bystander's recovery.
8. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
9. 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965).
10. Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (Super. Ct. 1965).
11. Mull v. Ford Motor Co., 368 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'g Mull v. Colt Co., 31
F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Kuschy v. Norris, 25 Conn. Supp. 383, 206 A.2d 275 (Super. Ct.
1964), overruled by Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (Super. Ct. 1965) ;
Rodriguez v. Shell's City, Inc., 141 So.2d 590 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962); Berzon v. Don Allen
Motors, Inc., 23 App. Div. 2d 530, 256 N.Y.S.2d 643 (4th Dept. 1965).
12. See e.g., Gilliam, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN A NUTSHELL, 37 ORE. L. REv. 119 (1958);
Llewellyn, ON WARRANTY OF QUALITY, AND SOCIETY, 36 COLUm. L. REv. 699 (1936).
13. The warranty action originally sounded in tort, Prosser, supra note 8 at 802. In
1778 Lord Mansfield's court held that the form of action for warranty was assumpsit,
Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Doug. 18, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (1778).
14. 10 M & W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
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the upsetting of the coach might bring a similar action."' 5 The problem of
the bystander's recovering absent a privity requirement was seen immedi-
ately by the courts.
The principle of Winterbottom v. Wright was adopted" and simul-
taneously distinguished17 by the courts of the United States. Numerous
exceptions riddled the rule'8 until its demise in MacPherson v. Buick
Motors Co., where Cardozo made privity obsolete as a requirement in a
negligence action against the manufacturer and other suppliers of chattels. 9
Finding negligence hard to prove, the courts turned to an action
based on breach of warranty in order to protect the consumer. 20 However,
an ironical and paradoxical problem then presented itself. Warranty was
an action in contract, and privity is a legitimate requirement in contract
actions, circumvented only by the third party beneficiary theory.2" By
giving warranty the attributes of tort liability, the courts were able to
abrogate the privity requirement in a development similar to the abroga-
tion of the privity requirement in negligence. 22 Yet negligence was a tort
action and the privity requirement was essentially artificial.
The first exceptions to privity in warranty cases were those involving
food, a judicial trend consistent with the public furor over food manu-
facture in the period of the muckrakers.23 The exception was then ex-
tended to products for intimate bodily use24 and products which were
inherently dangerous. 25 Beginning in 1958 with Spence v. Three Rivers
15. Id. at 114, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405 (emphasis supplied).
16. [Nat'l] Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879), in which the United States
Supreme Court used the principle to limit an attorney's liability for examining an abstract.
17. The New York court accepted it quickly in dicta in Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y.
397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852), but just as quickly distinguished it in the same case because it
involved an inherently dangerous product.
18. The inherently dangerous rule was used to create so many exceptions that it was
carried to absurdities. Boehlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other Than Their
Immediate Vendees, 45 L.Q. REV. 343 (1929).
19. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). The history of the abolition of privity in the
field of negligence of manufacturers is another one which has been well covered by judges and
scholars. See Boehlen, supra note 18.
20. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. App. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436,
440 (1944) (concurring opinion by Justice Traynor).
21. The development of third party beneficiary theories in order to get around privity in
certain contract cases has likewise been difficult for the courts since the days of the land-
mark case of Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
22. Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L. J. 887 (1967).
23. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913) was the first case to
abolish privity in breach of implied warranty of food. It was followed by Parks v. G. C.
Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 P. 202 (1914) and Jackson Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Chap-
man, 106 Miss. 864, 64 So. 791 (1914). See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1106-10 for other cases supporting this
position.
24. Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954) ; Kruper v. Procter
& Gamble Co., 113 N.E.2d 605 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 160 Ohio St.
489, 117 N.E.2d 7 (1954).
25. Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949). See also Di
Vello v. Gardner Machine Co., 46 Ohio Op. 161, 102 N.E.2d 289 (C.P. Cuyahoga Cty., 1951),
overruled by Wood v. General Electric Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953), over-
ruled by Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 277, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
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Building Supply"8 where liability was imposed for economic and prop-
erty loss from defects in building blocks, there was a gradual extension
of liability" culminating in the decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc.2
The Henningsen case, like the Uniform Commercial Code, estab-
lished an action for breach of warranty which is a hybrid between tort
and contract. 9 Then, Justice Traynor and the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia put warranty back into the law of torts in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products by removing the requirements of privity and notice.30 Warranty
was made a form of strict liability, a position adopted by the Restate-
ment." The courts of most other jurisdictions, however, are still in the
process of deciding what to do about privity, warranty, and strict liability.
If the requirement of privity is removed in warranty actions, the
courts are faced with the problem of how to limit liability. On the other
hand, if it remains as a bar to personal injury actions, the result can be
harsh and unjust. There are two possible approaches to the problem. One
is to maintain privity, but to develop certain exceptions to the rule or
alternative theories of recovery. This is the approach adopted by section
2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code. It offers the third party bene-
ficiary theory as a way to circumvent the privity requirement by extend-
ing the warranty to persons in the family or household of the buyer or to
those who are guests in his home.12 Although comment 2 to this section
states that the enumerated parties are not intended to enlarge or restrict
the developing case law, the effect of this section on some courts has been
to create a few narrow exceptions to the rule rather than an alternative
theory of recovery."
26. 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
27. See Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 39 and supplements thereto for an exhaustive discussion of
the cases.
28. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). Liability was imposed on the retailer and the
manufacturer when the purchaser's spouse was injured in a defective automobile.
29. Comment, Implied Warranty, Strict Liability for Personal Injuries, and the Uniform
Commercial Code, Section 2-318, 13 KAN. L. REv. 411 (1965).
30. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A (1965).
32. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318 provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who
is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is
reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume, or be affected by the goods
and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude
or limit the operation of this section.
The Code has been harshly criticized for its inadequacies in solving the problem of privity.
See, e.g., Weaver, Allocation of Risk in Products Liability Cases: The Need for a Revised
Third-Party Beneficiary Theory in UCC Warranty Actions, 52 VA. L. REv. 1028 (1966) and
Comment, 13 KAN. L. REV., note 29 supra. The drafters of the Code, however, deserve credit
for the flexibility which they did give the Code in the area of implied warranty. The Code
was drafted in the late forties and first adopted in the early fifties. The more progressive
RESTATEMENT was drafted in the early sixties, after the cases were giving a right of
recovery.
33. The reason for this is that the Code is adopted as the legislatures' own words, and
courts favoring strict statutory construction are reluctant to go beyond the words, despite
1968]
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Other divergent theories have been employed by the courts. In fact,
one author lists no less than twenty-nine.34 The following are examples: the
buyer is an agent of the injured party;85 the warranty runs with the
chattel; 36 the warranty rights are assigned to the user of the product;37
public policy should protect the person in possession;"8 and an interesting
case where the court defined privity as nothing more than the successive
right to possession.39 In those cases involving food, 40 products for inti-
mate bodily use,4 ' and inherently dangerous products42 flat exceptions are
generally made.
The other alternative is to abolish privity and to find some other means
of limiting liability. Thus, a few courts have replaced privity with some
other artificial requirement, e.g., the person injured by the product must
be a remote vendee,43 or he must be a consumer or user of the product. 44
The bystander, however, could not recover under either of these two
theories.
The Restatement took this alternative, abolished privity and limited
liability by a foreseeability test.45 It did not, however, answer the question
of whether or not a bystander can recover and expressly caveated that
point.46
urgings by draftsmen. A good example of this is Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa.
610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963). Pennsylvania was the first state to adopt the Code and it refused
to go beyond the words of the statute and permit recovery by an employee. Yet, the theory
of third-party beneficiary certainly applies in a situation where an employer purchases equip-
ment to be used by his employee. A New Jersey court felt that it had to stretch the word
"family" so as to include employees. Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing,
80 N.J. Super. 184, 198, 193 A.2d 275, 280 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 42 N.J. 177, 199
A.2d 826 (1964).
34. Gilliam, note 12 supra.
35. Freeman v. Navarre, 47 Wash. 2d 760, 289 P.2d 1015 (1955) ; Gillam, Judicial Legis-
lation, Legal Fictions, and Products Liability: The Agency Theory, 37 ORE. L. REV. 217
(1958).
36. Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927).
37. Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775,176 N.W. 382 (1920).
38. B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959); Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. App. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (concurring opinion of
Justice Traynor).
39. Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 353 P.2d 575 (1960).
40. See note 23 supra.
41. See note 24 supra.
42. See note 25 supra.
43. Loch v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949) ; Professor Kessler, note 22 supra at
892 says that the various ways which the courts have used advertising by the manufacturer
to create express warranties has really modified privity of contract to a kind of privity of
sale. Most courts allow recovery today by the purchaser against the manufacturer.
44. The injured party could not recover unless he was a user of the product in Mull v.
Ford Motor Co., 368 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1966) ; Rodriguez v. Shell's City, Inc., 141 So.2d 590
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1962), followed by Engel v. Lawyer's Cooperative Publishing Co., 198 So.2d
93 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967) ; The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) defines those
who can recover as "users and consumers."
45. The RESTATEMENT makes warranty strict liability and therefore the proximate cause
or within the risk tests of liability would apply. See Prosser, 50 MINN. L. REV., at 817-19
(1966) ; Freedman, Help for the Third Party Casual Bystander? Extension of Warranty Be-
yond Foreseeability? PLI HANDBOOK ON PRODUCTS LIABnIITY at 4-6 (1966).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment o (1965).
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The result of all this intricate and varied logic to expand warranty
protection is that, one by one, different classes of people have been given
a cause of action. Included among these have been spouses,47 other family
members, 48 guests,49 friends," employees, 5 ' passengers 5 2 and in a few
cases, the innocent bystander.1
3
Florida, a progressive state in developing the law of implied war-
ranty,M first permitted recovery in the absence of privity in a food case.
In Blanton v. The Cudahy Packing Co. the court held that the implied
warranty of wholesomeness of food extended to the ultimate consumer."
In 1956 an intriguing decision was handed down by Justice Terrell
of the Supreme Court of Florida in Matthews v. Lawnlite58 A prospec-
tive customer sat in a lawn chair on display in a retail store. His finger
was amputated by the moving parts of the chair. The court discussed the
lack of a privity requirement in negligence under Restatement section
398,11 and then discussed implied warranty. It held that a lawnchair was
not a dangerous instrumentality like a gun, an automobile, or an airplane,
but that an innocent looking lawnchair which concealed a dangerous de-
vice was thereby a dangerous instrumentality. 8 Finally, the court held
47. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
48. McBurnette v. Playground Equip. Co., 137 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1962) ; Shamrock Fuel &
Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 406 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
49. Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963).
50. Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D.C. Hawaii 1961).
51. Vandercook & Son, Inc. v. Thorpe, 344 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Barfield v. At-
lantic Coast Line, 197 So.2d 545 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967); Williams v. Union Carbide Corp., 17
App. Div. 2d 661, 230 N.Y.S.2d 476 (2d Dept. 1962); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6
Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966) ; Brewer v. Oriard Powder Co., 66 Wash. 2d 187, 401
P.2d 844 (1965).
52. Middleton v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); King v.
Douglas Aircraft Co., 159 So.2d 108 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) ; Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument
Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
53. Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (Super. Ct. 1965) ; Piercefield v.
Remington Arms, 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965). For an excellent discussion of the
bystander before Piercefield see Note, Strict Products Liability and the Bystander, 64 COLUM.
L. REv. 916 (1964).
54. In 1919, the court in American Mfg. Co. v. A. H. McLeod & Co., 78 Fla. 162, 82 So.
802 (1919) held that when the buyer purchased an article relying on the seller's skill and
judgment, and the seller knew the buyer's purpose, an implied warranty of fitness arose. In
Smith v. Burdines, 144 Fla. 500, 198 So. 223 (1940), the court found an implied warranty
for fitness of particular purpose in the purchase of a lipstick.
55. 154 Fla. 872, 19 So.2d 313 (1944). The case was followed by Food Fair Stores v.
Macurda, 93 So.2d 860 (1957) ; Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 62 So.2d 910 (Fla.
1953) ; Cliett v. Lauderdale-Biltmore Corp., 39 So.2d 476 (Fla. 1949). The case of Spencer v.
Carl's Markets, 45 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1950) went even further in holding the retailer of canned
sardines liable although he could not, of course, have caused the defect. In the early fifties
a strange case, Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1953), rev'd on other
grounds on rehearing, 75 So.2d 306 (1954), extended implied warranty in the absence of
privity to seed. The effect of this case is weakened by the fact that mislabeling of seed was a
violation of statutes, FiA. STAT. 578.09 and 578.13.
56. 88 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1956).
57. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 398 (1934), which provides for manufacturers to be
liable for negligence.
58. 88 So.2d 299, 300 (Fla. 1956). The use of the term "dangerous instrumentality" or
"imminently" or "inherently dangerous" is really an attempt by courts to extend liability
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that the manufacturer of this particular lawnchair was liable under Re-
statement section 398. 59 The case is frequently cited 6° to show that privity
is not required for implied warranty for a dangerous instrumentality.
However, the language of the courts makes it difficult to tell whether they
are discussing negligence or breach of implied warranty.61 Nonetheless,
privity of contract in an action for breach of implied warranty by a sub-
purchaser to recover economic loss was considered unnecessary in Cor-
nelius v. Continental Copper Co.62
The Florida trend of extending implied warranty regardless of privity
was arrested by the case of Carter v. Hector Supply Co.63 The "way out"
provided by the case of Matthews v. Lawnlite 4 was utilized by the court,
i.e., classifying the chattel as not being a dangerous instrumentality.65
Carter was at once narrowly construed and confined to its facts in a sub-
sequent supreme court case, McBurnette v. Playground Equipment Corp.66
In that case a child who was injured on a swing set was permitted to re-
cover because the purchase by his father was for his benefit and use.6"
Although the McBurnette court tried to restrict Carter v. Hector Supply
Co.,68 frequent citation to Carter by the courts show that it still has strong
force.69
In Rodriguez v. Shell's City, Inc., the district court developed the
requirement that the injured party be a user in order to recover, refusing
while pretending, perhaps only to themselves, that the privity requirement still exists. At
other times, when recovery is denied, it provides for the courts a convenient "way out" of
finding liability. See notes 65 and 66 infra and accompanying text. The use of the term results
in a tautology, a thing is usually a "dangerous instrumentality" if it causes the plaintiff bodily
harm of such nature that he would sustain damages for a suit. There are a few products like
dynamite, poison, and gas which are truly "inherently dangerous" but most of the cases do
not deal with such items and these terms have caused great confusion. It was Cardozo in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) who first pointed out
how the term "inherently dangerous" was extended to absurdities. He said that products
which because of their nature would be dangerous if negligently made, and the seller can
foresee this danger, are of imminent danger. His words have been turned into the "immi-
nently dangerous" or "dangerous instrumentality" qualification presently used by the courts.
All three terms are mixed up without an understanding of what they mean. Matthews v.
Lawnlite, 88 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1956) is a good example of this.
59. See note 58 supra.
60. See, e.g., Toombs v. Fort Pierce Gas Co., 208 So.2d 615, 617 (Fla. 1968) ; Carter v.
Hector Supply Co., 128 So.2d 390, 392 (Fla. 1961) ; King v. Douglas Aircraft, 159 So.2d
108, 110 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
61. Kolodgy & Capps, Torts, Florida Survey, 12 U. MIAMI L. REv. 469, 490-91 (1958).
62. 104 So.2d 40 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958); see also Power Ski of Florida, Inc. v. Allied
Chemical Corp., 188 So.2d 13 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
63. 128 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1961).
64. 88 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1961).
65. 128 So.2d at 391.
66. 137 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1962). It is interesting to note that Thornal, author of the
Carter opinion, did not sit on this court.
67. Id. at 566.
68. Id. at 565.
69. Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So.2d 743, 751 n.4 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967);
Winston v. Friedor Realty Corp., 201 So.2d 96, 97 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967); Power Ski of Fla.,
Inc. v. Southern Resin & Fiberglass Corp., 174 So.2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
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to allow a bystander a cause of action.70 Then, in Brookshire v. Florida
Bendix Co., a district court held that there must be a sale and and not
just a bailment to recover in the absence of privity.71
Lily-Tulip Corp. v. Bernstein, held that a hospital patient who was
burned while using a paper cup could recover on implied warranty 72 and
flatly stated that privity was no longer required to maintain an action for
implied warranty in Florida.73 This sweeping, "no holds barred" attitude
remained dicta until confirmed by the holding in Toombs. 4
The reasoning in the Toombs case was not based on Lily-Tulip Corp.
v. Bernstein,75 but on Matthews v. Lawnlite76 and McBurnette v. Play-
ground Equipment Corp." The Matthews decision meant that privity was
not required for breach of implied warranty in cases involving a "danger-
ous instrumentality. ' 78 The McBurnette case held that privity was not
required for a child who stood in the shoes of his father, the purchaser.79
The court in Toombs concluded that the bystanders could recover for
breach of implied warranty in the absence of privity in dangerous instru-
mentality cases if they were necessarily in the vicinity of the hazard.80
The instant case removed the requirements of privity and use. The
court expressly discredited Rodriguez v. Shell's City, Inc.81 and its re-
70. 141 So.2d 590 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
71. 153 So.2d 55 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963). The lower court in the Toombs case, 193 So.2d
669 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966), cited Brookshire v. Fla. Bendix as support for the proposition that
breach of implied warranty does not apply to a bailment. Since the supreme court distin-
guished the Toombs case from a bailment (see note 4 supra) the Brookshire case still stands.
Only a few courts have considered breach of implied warranty in non-sale cases, and most
of them hold that the bailor is only under a duty to make the chattel reasonably safe. An
excellent case holding the bailor liable and exploring the pros and cons of doing so is Cin-
trone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965). An ex-
cellent article on the subject is Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales
Cases, 57 CoLum. L. REv. 653 (1957).
72. 181 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1966), aff'g 177 So.2d 362 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
73. 181 So.2d at 641.
74. Many courts use sweeping language that privity is abolished, but such language is
not always followed when the court is confronted with a bystander situation. See Berzon v.
Don Allen Motors, Inc., 23 App. Div. 2d 530, 256 N.Y.S.2d 643 (4th Dept. 1965).
75. 181 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1966).
76. 88 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1956).
77. 137 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1962).
78. 208 So.2d 615, 617 (Fla. 1968).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 141 So.2d 590 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962). An understanding of the import of the Toombs
case requires an understanding of the word "bystander." To the Florida courts it means a
non-user. In the case of Rodriguez, the bystander was a sister of the user, not just a stranger.
The true bystander would be someone more than just a non-user, a stranger or a member
of the general public. Only one case, Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694
(Super. Ct. 1965), has given recovery to this type bystander. The bystander in Piercefield v.
Remington Arms, 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965), was the brother of the purchaser.
The Toombs case, involving people who lived next door, is somewhere in the middle of these
two cases. One case, Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 406 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1966) involved a situation like Rodriguez (boy poured kerosene on son of purchaser),
but the bystander implications were not even discussed when recovery was allowed. A user
requirement certainly would have been absurd in that situation.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-318, note 32 supra, there is no requirement
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quirement that the plaintiff be a user. It replaced these limits on liability
with a more reasonable requirement, a foreseeability test. A prognostica-
tion from the case is a little difficult because the court used language such
as "imminently dangerous." It is also unclear as to the test for those
"9necessarily in the vicinity of the hazard." However, most items that
cause injury can be classed as "imminently dangerous" if defective, their
danger being proved by the fact that they caused injury.82 The words "im-
minently dangerous" are significant as they leave the court a possible
"way out" in a fact situation where they do not wish to find for the plain-
tiff. However, such situations seem unlikely when the law provides the
principles necessary to find liability.
One thing seems clear. The usual case involving a bystander is that
of the pedestrian or person in the "other car" who is involved in an auto-
mobile accident. The automobile is considered a "dangerous instrumental-
ity" under Florida products liability law. 8 Now, the manufacturer of
defective automobiles will be liable to those necessarily within the vicinity
of the hazard when injured. In a day when defective vehicles can so fre-
quently cause death, in a world of mass-production luxury and a pros-
perous Detroit, is it so dire a consequence that Lord Arbinger's prophecy
of "any person passing along the road" having a cause of action comes
true? 4 This observer thinks not.
SUSAN L. TEW
that the third party beneficiaries be users. Members of the family and guests in the home,
who might be denied recovery as bystanders, could recover under that section. Comment, 13
KAN. L. REv., supra note 29, at 418.
82. See note 59 supra.
83. Carter v. Hector Supply Co., 128 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1961); Matthews v. Lawnlite,
88 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1956). This classification provided the rationale of allowing an airplane
passenger to recover (airplanes were termed along with the automobile as dangerous instru-
mentalities in these cases) in King v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 159 So.2d 108 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1963). But see Heilman v. Hertz Corp. 306 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1962), where the federal court
would not allow recovery in a bailment case, by refusing to call the automobile a danger-
ous instrumentality under Florida warranty law and confining the application to tort law
where the plaintiff sues a defendant driver for negligence in the operation of the vehicle.
84. Freedman, supra note 45, believes that allowing recovery by the bystander is not
foreseeable and is a travesty on justice. It is true that those involved in automobile accidents
may forego suing the other driver and sue the manufacturer. However, in cases where the
other car was defective, and this, not the driver's negligence caused the accident, what other
recourse would the injured party have other than a cause of action against the manufacturer?
